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SOCIAL SECURITY
Should a Disability Benefits Claimant
Be Allowed to Show That Her Previous
Occupation Is Obsolete?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 27-30. © 2003 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Can the commissioner of Social
Security determine that a claimant
is not "disabled" within the meaning
of the Social Security Act (the Act)
because the claimant remains physi-
cally and mentally able to do her
previous work, without first deter-
mining whether that previous work
exists in significant amounts in the
national economy?
FACTS
Pauline Thomas worked as a house-
keeper until 1988 when she had a
heart attack. Thomas then worked
as an elevator operator until she
was laid off in August 1995. After
her position was eliminated,
Thomas applied to the Social
Security Administration for
Supplemental Security Income and
Disability Insurance benefits, claim-
ing that she had a heart condition
and related medical problems.
According to her July 11, 1996,
application, she suffered from irreg-
ular heartbeat, high blood pressure,
dizziness, and fatigue. Thomas also
claimed that she suffered form low-
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er-back problems caused by lumbar
radiculopathy and asserted that she
had fractured an ankle on July 8,
1996. She was 54 years old at the
time of her application.
The commissioner of Social
Security denied her application and
an administrative law judge upheld
the denial. The administrative law
judge (ALJ) found that Thomas had
hypertension, cardiac arrhythmia,
cervical and lumbar strain/sprain,
and a transient isehemic attack, but
that she did not have an impair-
ment listed in the list of impair-
ments that are presumed to be
severe enough to preclude any gain-
ful work. The ALJ also found that
Thomas had the residual functional
capacity to perform at least light
work, and therefore that she could
perform her past relevant work as
an elevator operator. The ALJ
rejected Thomas's argument that
her past relevant work as an eleva-
tor operator no longer exists in the
(Continued on Page 28)
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national economy. According to the
ALJ, Social Security regulations
excluded from Step Four of the
sequential process for determining
disability any inquiry into whether
the past work actually exists.
Holding that Step Four considers
only whether a claimant can per-
form her previous job, the ALJ ruled
that Thomas was not under a "dis-
ability" and ended the evaluation at
that point without proceeding to the
next step.
Thomas sought review by the U.S.
District Court for the District of
New Jersey. The district court also
upheld the denial, ruling that
Thomas was not disabled under the
five-step sequential process for
determining eligibility for disability
benefits because it found that she
could continue to perform her pre-
vious work as an elevator operator.
The district court ruled that even if
Thomas was unable to perform any
job that exists in substantial num-
bers in the national economy and
even if she met all the other
requirements for Disability and
Supplemental Security Income ben-
efits, she still could not obtain bene-
fits because the fact remained that
she could perform a job serving as
an elevator operator.
Thomas then appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. Reversing the district court,
the Third Circuit agreed with
Thomas that she should have been
permitted to show that elevator-
operator jobs no longer exist in sub-
stantial numbers in the national
economy. 294 F.3d 568 (3d Cir.
2002) (en banc). Based on the rele-
vant provisions of the Social
Security Act and the broader statu-
tory scheme, the Third Circuit held
that for the purposes of Step Four of
the evaluation process, a claimant's
previous work must be substantial
gainful work that continues to exist
in the national economy. The Third
Circuit determined that a claimant
may proceed to Step Five by show-
ing either that the claimant cannot
perform her past work or that the
previous work is no longer substan-
tial gainful work that exists in the
national economy.
Although the literal language of the
regulation governing Step Four
appears to support the AL's deci-
sion to terminate the inquiry at
Step Four, the Third Circuit said
that this regulation should be read,
if possible, so as not to conflict with
the statute it implements. According
to the Third Circuit, a literal read-
ing of the regulation regarding Step
Four would set up an artificial road-
block to an accurate determination
of whether Thomas can "engage in
any ... kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national
economy." The court explained that
if Thomas can show that elevator-
operator positions really are obso-
lete, then the fact that she still pos-
sesses the physical or mental capa-
bility to perform the duties of an
elevator operator would not estab-
lish that she can engage in any sub-
stantial gainful activity that actually
exists.
The Third Circuit concluded that
the ALJ should have allowed
Thomas to present evidence on
whether elevator-operator positions
are obsolete. If Thomas had made
such a showing, the court ruled that
the ALJ then should have proceeded
to Step Five of the sequential evalu-
ation to ascertain whether Thomas's
medical impairments prevent her
from engaging in any work that
actually exists.
The Supreme Court thereafter
granted the commissioner's request
that it review the Third Circuit's
decision. 123 S.Ct. 1251 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
Title II of the Social Security Act
provides Social Security disability
insurance benefits for individuals
who are "under a disability" and
meet other eligibility requirements.
42 U.S.C. § 423(a). The Act also
provides Supplementary Security
Income benefits for "disabled" indi-
gent persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1382. The
Act defines "disability" as follows:
(1) The term "disability"
means-
(A) inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by rea-
son of any medically deter-
minable physical or mental
impairment which can be expect-
ed to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.
(2) For purposes of paragraph
(1)(A)-
(A) An individual shall be deter-
mined to be under a disability
only if his physical or mental
impairment or impairments are
of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous
work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experi-
ence, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in
which he lives, or whether a spe-
cific job vacancy exists for him,
or whether he would be hired if
he applied for work. For purposes
of the preceding sentence (with
respect to any individual), "work
which exists in the national econ-
omy" means work which exists in
significant numbers either in the
region where such individual
lives or in several regions of the
country.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3) (providing the
same definitions for Supplemental
Security income benefits).
Issue No. 1
The Social Security regulations pro-
vide a sequential evaluation process
for determining whether a claimant
is under a disability. At Step One,
the commissioner determines
whether the claimant is currently
engaging in a "substantial gainful
activity." If the claimant is
engaging in a "substantial gainful
activity," the claimant is not eligible
for benefits.
At Step Two, the commissioner
determines whether the claimant
has a "severe impairment." If the
claimant does not have a severe
impairment, the claimant is not eli-
gible for benefits. At Step Three, the
commissioner determines whether
the claimant suffers from an impair-
ment on the list of impairments pre-
sumed to be severe enough to pre-
clude gainful work. If he or she does
not, the commissioner moves to
Step Four.
At Step Four, the commissioner
decides whether the claimant
retains the residual functional
capacity to perform the claimant's
past relevant work. The claimant
bears the burden of demonstrating
an inability to return to past rele-
vant work. If the claimant is unable
to resume the former occupation,
the evaluation moves to Step Five.
At Step Five, the commissioner has
the burden of demonstrating that
the claimant is capable of perform-
ing other jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy.
The commissioner argues that per-
mitting a claimant to proceed to
Step Five if the claimant can show
that his or her past job does not
exist in significant numbers in the
national economy would convert
disability benefits into unemploy-
ment benefits. Thomas disagrees,
arguing that awarding disability ben-
efits to a claimant who, as a result
of a qualifying impairment, cannot
perform any job that actually exists
is hardly the equivalent of providing
unemployment compensation.
According to Thomas, denying ben-
efits because a claimant could per-
form a type of job that does not
exist seems nonsensical.
According to the commissioner, the
Social Security Administration's
construction of the Act is entitled to
great deference and is supported by
the text of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) and
the Act's evolution and history. The
commissioner contends that the
Third Circuit's construction is
inconsistent with Congress's intent
in enacting that provision. She
claims that the commissioner's long-
standing construction serves sound
purposes in the administration of
the disability programs. The com-
missioner explains that the ability
to perform a prior job is the most
concrete and individualized mea-
sure of the individual's capabilities;
consequently, if the claimant is
in sufficient physical and mental
condition to perform his or her pre-
vious work, the impairment is clear-
ly not so severe as to preclude
employment.
Rejecting this argument, Thomas
contends that the Third Circuit's
construction is superior to that of
the commissioner because it is the
only construction that harmonizes
the intent, result, and plain meaning
of the statute's defining provision in
paragraph (1)(A) with its effectuat-
ing/describing provision in para-
graph (2)(A). Thomas says that the
Third Circuit's construction is the
logical manner in which to link the
remedial character of the Social
Security Act with the realities of the
workplace that need the remedy.
The commissioner argues that it is
speculative to hypothesize about
claimants who can do only one form
of work (a particular past job) and
no other, only to see that one form
of work cease to exist in significant
numbers in the national economy.
She states that no principle of statu-
tory construction requires Congress
to anticipate-or imposes a pre-
sumption that Congress is deemed
to anticipate-such a remote
hypothetical case and to fashion
the definitions of disability, govern-
ing millions of claims each year, to
accommodate it.
On the other hand, Thomas asserts
that the commissioner's scientific,
statistical study on the availability
and existence of jobs for persons of
differing ages, schooling, skills and
physical capacities yields the empir-
ical result that no jobs exist in sig-
nificant numbers that can accom-
modate her residual capacity and
vocational profile. Thomas says that
the only job identified by the com-
missioner is Thomas's previous
occupation-an occupation that no
longer exists.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court is called upon
to resolve a disagreement among the
circuit courts of appeals with
respect to the proper construction
of the Social Security Act. The
Ninth and Sixth Circuits disagree
with the Third Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the Act. See Quang Van Han
v. Bowen, 882 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir.
1989) (indicating that the interpre-
tation that the Third Circuit set out
is a reasonable interpretation, but
stating that it is "not the only one");
Garcia v. Secretar, of Health &
Human Services, 46 F.3d 552 (6th
Cir. 1995) (same). The Eighth and
Fourth Circuits also disagree with
the Third Circuit's position. See
Rater v. Chater, 73 F.3d 796 (8th
Cir. 1996); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d
1200 (4th Cir. 1995).
In Kolman v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d
212 (7th Cir. 1991), the Seventh
Circuit held that the AL should
have continued to Step Five because
(Continued on Page 30)
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the claimant's past job was a tempo-
rary position. In dicta, the court
observed that even if a claimant's
past job was a permanent position,
an ALJ would be required to move
to Step Five if that past job had dis-
appeared. The Seventh Circuit not-
ed that the fact a claimant could
perform a past job that no longer
exists would not be "a rational
ground for denying benefits." The
Seventh Circuit stated:
The failure of the regulations
to require that the job consti-
tuting the applicant's past work
exists in significant numbers
probably just reflects an
assumption that jobs that
existed five or ten or even fif-
teen years ago still exist. But if
the assumption is dramatically
falsified in a particular case,
the administrative law judge is
required to move on to the
next stage and inquire whether
some other job that the appli-
cant can perform exists in
significant numbers today
somewhere in the national
economy.
A decision by the Supreme Court to
uphold the commissioner's position
in the Thomas case would mean
that an inability to engage in sub-
stantial gainful activity is not "by
reason of" the impairment if the
claimant retains the physical and
mental capacity to perform the
claimant's former job. Because the
Social Security Administration
decides more than 2 million claims
for disability benefits each year, it
has been suggested that the Third
Circuit's interpretation would intro-
duce a significant and unnecessary
new burden into the massive dis-
ability program. In addition, the
Third Circuit's construction could
preclude consideration of a
claimant's ability to do the
claimant's former work any time
that job does not exist in "signifi-
cant numbers" in the national econ-
omy, including cases in which the
claimant's former position is avail-
able to the claimant.
On the other hand, if the Third
Circuit's construction is upheld, it
has been suggested that the Social
Security Administration would not
be overburdened by a "broader
inquiry" because the Third Circuit's
construction does not change the
scheme of the sequential evaluation.
The burden will still remain with
the claimant at the Fourth Step.
The commissioner still will not need
to award disability unless it is satis-
fied that no other job existing in sig-
nificant numbers can fit the
claimant's residual capacity.
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Issue No. 1
